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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BANBERRY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, McKEAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, MIDWEST REALTY
AND FINANCE, INC., a Utah
corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
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)

Case No. 16872

,

)
)

vs.
SOUTH JORDAN CITY, a
Municipal Corporation,
DefendantAppellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AND CROSS APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought under the Declaratory Judgment
Act against South Jordan City by three subdividers for a
determination as to the validity of certain ordinances and
regulations relating to water connection fees and park improvement
fees.
Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that the water connection fee of South Jordan City:

(1) constitutes an unlawful

taking of property without due process of law;

(2) that the fee

is unreasonable and constitutes an unlawful and unconstitutional
tax on the plaintiffs;

(3) that the park improvement fee con-

stitutes an unlawful taking of property without due process of
law;

(4) that the park improvement fee is unreasonable in its

amount and also constitutes an unlawful taking; and (5) that
the water connection fee and park improvement fee constitutes
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered
the Utah State Library.in violation
discrimination
against
the by
plaintiffs
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

P~onomic

of Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code.

Plaintiffs

sought a temporary restraining order, a declaration that the
ordinances as applied are unconstitutional and void, and money
damages.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Dean Conder granted Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Count I of the Complaint and entered a
permanent injunction restraining and enjoining South Jordan
City from requiring the payment of the water connection fee
for each lot by the plaintiff subdividers as a condition for
final plat approval.
The lower court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
as to Counts III, IV and V and held that the park improvement
fee was valid.
On January 2, 1980, the trial court entered its order
denying the Defendant's Motion to Alter and/or Amend the
Judgment.

This appeal was taken by the defendant on

January 16, 1980.

(R. 71).

Plaintiffs cross-appealed from

the Order dismissing the Third, Fourth and Fifth Causes of
Action on January 30, 1980.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the lower court order
nullifying the water connection fee charged subdividers as a
prerequisite to water service.

Plaintiffs also cross-appeal

and seek an order of this Court that the park recreation fee
is also void or, in the alternative, seek the remand of that
issue to the lower court for a trial on the merits.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because plaintiffs-subdividers are both respondents and
cross-appellants, they will be referred to as "plaintiffs" and
South Jordan City as "defendant" throughout this brief for the
convenience of this Court and the parties.
Plaintiffs do not dispute the Statement of Facts contained
in the South Jordan City brief with certain limited exceptions.
Defendant failed to note that the parties stipulated that it was
necessary for any developer to pay a "Park Improvement Fee" in the
sum of $235 per dwelling unit before being allowed to connect
to the city's water main.

(R. 102-103).

While it is true that

plaintiffs have "repeatedly admitted that defendant-appellant
city has the right to collect a water connection fee," plaintiffs
have never admitted that such fee now charged by the city is
reasonable or that the method of computation charged for the
subdividers is reasonable.

Rather, plaintiffs have admitted that

some type of connection fee is justified both as to the connection
made by the subdividers to the city's water line and as to the
charge to each individual property owner to the subdivision water
line.
The magnitude of the ordinances in question was also omitted
by the defendant city.

The collective amounts owing to the city

by the three plaintiff subdividers is in the area of a quarter of
a million dollars in water connection fees and park improvement
fees.

(R. 126).

Under the present statutory scheme, this amount

of money would have to be paid to the city before a single resident
completed his home on one of the approximately 40U lots presently

-3-
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being developed by the plaintiffs.
Finally, defendant omits to note that plaintiffs have
cross-appealed in this case as to the lower court's order
dismissing their complaint for the imposition of a park fee
to be paid by plaintiffs prior to water service being commenced.
Plaintiffs will first respond to the arguments raised by
South Jordan City in its brief and will then assert its own
arguments on its cross-appeal.
ARGUMENT
.POINT I
.THE:'TRIA:U COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS TO THE INVALIDITY OF THE WATER CONNECTION PREPAYMENT FEE.
This controversy concerns the imposition of water connection
fees by the defendant upon the plaintiffs, who are real estate
subdividers.

Each of the plaintiffs own parcels of land within

the South Jordan City boundaries and have undertaken to develop
these parcels into residential housing subdivisions.
The South Jordan City Council enacted Ordinance No. 13-1-5
(Exhibit D-1) which stated the following:
Application for water connection by subdi viders. Whenever a subdivider desires or
requires to install a water connection and
extension for a subdivision, the subdivider
shall enter into a written extension agreement
which shall constitute an application for permission to make said extension and connection
and an agreement specifying the terms and
conditions under which the water extensions and
connections shall be made and the payment that
shall be required.
Accordingly, a "Subdivision Water Service Extension Agreement"
was devised by the defendant corporation.

(Exhibit D-2) •

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The Extension Agreement required various plans, bonds, and
inspections concerning the construction of a water system and
provides requirements which are generally in accordance with
other extension agreements of surrounding counties.
However, paragraph 10 of the Extension Agreement is unique
to South Jordan City.

It states the following:

Cost of Construction. The Applicant hereby
agrees to bear the total cost of constructing
all water lines required for the servicing of the
subdivision or development (to include extensions
from existing city water mains to the subdivision,
the water system within the subdivision and service
lines to each lot in the subdivision).
In consideration therefor, the city shall charge the
Applicant a connection fee in the amount of
$
for each individual dwelling to be
served within the subdivision, which sums shall be
payable in full to the city before the subdivision
system is connected to any existing city water main.
(Emphasis added. )
It is thus undisputed by the parties that the Extension
Agreement now in effect and required to be signed by all real
estate developers provides that the developer must pay to the
city the aggregate dollar amount of all the potential water
connection fees within that subdivision.

In other words, if

the subdivision would support 100 homes, the developer must pay
100 times the water connection fee to the city before the city
will allow the subdivision to be connected to the city water
supply.

This is true even if there are no homes in the

subdivision which are actually.using the water.
A.

Defendant's Fee Structure for Water Connection is

Contrary to Utah Statutory Law.
Plaintiffs do not disagree with defendant that municipalities
in Utah are granted broad powers for the protection of the health
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
-5-administered by the Utah State Library.
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and welfare of their residents.

Neither do plaintiffs disagree

that a variety of state laws have been enacted concerning the
powers of municipalities to provide water and sewer services.
(Brief of South Jordan City, pp. 8-9).
Plaintiffs do dispute, however, the right of South Jordan
City to charge plaintiffs a "use or service" charge when no
"use or service" has actually been performed.

Utah law is

clear that the city in this instance is acting well beyond its
statutory power.
This Court on at least two occasions has held that sewer
connection fees are neither revenue measures, taxes, nor assessments but are payments for services furnished.

Murray City v.

Board of Education of Murray City School District, 16 U.2d 115,
396 P.2d 628 (1964); Home Builders Association of Greater Salt Lake
vs. Provo City, 28 U.2d 402, 503 P.2.d 451 (1972).

Likewise,

this Court in the recent case of Rupp v. Grantsville City, slip
opinion (Utah, March 27, 1980), held that an ordinance requiring
a $300 sewer hookup connection charge was proper since each person
required to join the system benefited from its use.
There is no specific Utah case concerning a connection fee
for water service.
hookups.

All prior cases have dealt solely with sewer

However, Utah statutory law explicitly gives cities

the power to couple water service with s·ewage service.

Section

10-8-38, Utah Code Annotated (the section cited by the lower
court in its decision) requires mandatory hookups to any sewer
system when the sewer "is available and within 300 feet of any
property line with any building used for human occupancy" and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In addition, the law states that when the city is also operating
its own water works system that it may make one charge for both
water service and sewer serviceG

In the event an occupant fails

to hook up to the sewer service the town is authorized to shut
off the water until such time as the hookup into the sewer has
occurred.
In the instant case, Defendant was not operating its
own sewer system but was contracting this to a sewer improvement
district.

Section 17-6-22, U.C.A.

(also relied upon by the lower

ourt) provides that it may also charge its water fee concurrently
with the sewer fee and that the enforcement may be secured in the
same manner as that enumerated in Section 10-8-38.

This Court

in ~ supra. also approved the use of the discontinuance of
water service as a method of enforcing mandatory sewer connections.
Defendant relies upon Section 10-7-10 which states that a
city does not have to "furnish" water unless the owner agrees
in writing that he will pay for all water furnished to any
"house, tenement, apartment, building, place, premises or lots."
This provision is nearly identical to Section 10-8-38, u.c.A.,
which also permits a city to require the owner to agree to pay
for both sewer and water before such services need be furnished.
It is thus obvious that the Utah legislature has treated
sewer and water connections as virtually inseparable.

It can

thus fairly be said that if a sewer hookup fee is a payment
for services furnished (Murray City, supra, and Home Builders
Association of Greater Salt Lake, supra), then the connection of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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administered
by the Utah State
Library.
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The Legislature did not require the hookup of a sewer
system in areas where there is not a building used for human
occupancy within 300 feet of the sewer line.

Thus, an owner of

an empty lot does not have to pay a sewer hookup fee.

There is

likewise no requirement that the owner of a vacant lot must pay
a water hookup fee, although such an owner could, if he desired,
request water service to the empty lot and would under the terms
of Section 10-7-10 be required to pay for the cost of furnishing
the water.

Thus, if the hundreds of lots involved in this

litigation were all sold tomorrow to separate purchasers, the city
could not mandate them to connect either to the sewer or to the
water lines until such time as buildings used for human occupancy
had been completed.
In an effort to avoid the statutory commandment, Defendant
has sought to charge plaintiffs the water connection fee for
each and every lot in the subdivision prior to any building on
the lots by individuals.

Defendant has attempted to do this not

by ordinance but by its "Subdivision Water Service Extension
Agreement," which supplements the ordinance.
The city has incurred no pecuniary expenditure whatsoever
in the development of these subdivisions.

Paragraph 10 of the

Agreement required plaintiff to "bear the total cost of constructing all

~ater

lines required for the servicing of the subdivision

or development."

Plaintiffs have completely built the water

system within the subdivision and have only asked to connect
to the pre-existing city water lines.

For this privilege,

defendant city has sought a "connection charge" not for the one
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Cl

connection to the main line, but for the aggregate

of potential

connections to the subdividers' total number of lots.
Utah statutory law clearly does not allow this type of
action.

Defendant city is attempting to charge for a use and

service to hundreds of lots when in fact there has been no use
or service to any lot.

Aside from the fact that the subdivision

water pipes would be full of city water, the city itself has
suffered no loss nor has it had to increase any of its services
to provide water.

The city is asking for a total of nearly $300,000

because three feeder pipes of three subdivisions have been attached
to the existing water lines of the city.

Defendant city is therefore

given a windfall of some $300,000 when it has, in fact, done
nothing or incurred no further obligation than before the subdivision systems were hooked into the city lines.
Plaintiffs have already incurred substantial expenses in
laying the water system within the subdivision itself.

It is

not the responsibility of plaintiffs to contribute to the city
water system's construction and maintenance when it does not in
fact use such system.

Under Utah law there are several ways a

city may provide funds for a water system.

First, Section

10-7-7, U.C.A. allows the city to issue bonds for the purpose of
supplying the city with water.

Similarly, the Metropolitan Water

District Act provides that if a water district is created bonds
may be issued.

Section

73~8-26

to Section 73-8-31, U.C.A.

The municipality may also establish a special improvement
district and charge a special assessment for capital improvements
under the provisions of Section 10-15-1, U.C.A., the "Municipal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology -9Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Impnovement District Act."

Under the provisions of this Act,

procedures are required in which the property owners are given
notice of proposed improvements and hearings must be held before
the special improvement district can be created.
10-16-4 through Section 10-16-7, u.c.A.

Section

The assessment allowed

in such a special improvement district is stated as follows:
Assessments shall be levied on all nlocks, lots,
parts of lots, tracts or parcels of property
bounding, abutting upon or adjacent to the
improvements or which may be inspected or
specially benefited by the improvements to the
extent of the benefits to such property by
reasons of the improvements . . . Assessments
shall be equal and uniform adcording to the
benefits received.
In the instant case the City of South Jordan has not elected
to either issue bonds nor to create a special assessment tax
for a water system.

Instead, the city has required the plaintiffs

to provide their own internal subdivision water systems.

Any

external water system feeding such subdivision should be financed
by the entire community through either bonds, assessment districts.
Defendant South Jordan City argues repeatedly that Section
10-7-10 gives the city statutory authority to require the fee
imposed against the plaintiffs in this case.

As noted previously,

this section states that a town does not have to furnish water to
its inhabitants for "the use in any house, tenement, apartment,
building, place, premises or lots" unless the owner signs an
application that he will pay for all water "furnished."

Defen-

dant's argument continues that it has furnished water since it is
Sponsored
by the S.J.through
Quinney Law Library.
for digitization provided byline
the Institute
of Museum
and Library
Services
now
flowing
theFunding
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and
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a water
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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connection fee should be collected by the city.
Defendant's argument is entirely without merit.

Section

10-7-10 was written for the express purpose of requiring owners
of property to be responsible for the use of any water on that
property even though it is an agent or tenant which utilizes the
water.

Under the city's argument the subdividers would be "owners"

and would therefore be responsible for all future use of the
water in the subdivision and would be perpetually assessed a
monthly charge for all water consumed by all residents of the
three subdivisions.

This clearly is not what the defendant

intended in its own Agreement.

Specifically, in fact, paragraph 6

of Defendant's Subdivision Water Service Agreement" states the
following:
As each house is connected to the line,
the owner thereof shall be required to sign the
city's standard application for service and
agree to abide by the city's rules and regulations and to pay the city's monthly service
charge. All repair and maintenance expenses for
water facilities and lines located on irtdividual
lots within the subdivision or development shall
be borne by the respective owners of said lot.
(Emphasis added.)
It is obvious from this language that the city fully intended
that each lot owner would be responsible for his own water charges
and that separate agreements would be written between the city
and each lot owner.

The city cannot, on the one hand, say that

plaintiffs own the entire subdivision and are thus responsible
for the connectin fee while, at the same time, saying that the
monthly charges should be assessed to the individual lot owners.
Clearly, both the connectionfee and the monthly fees are proper
service
only
to Funding
the forlot
owner
and
notof Museum
to the
subdivider.
Sponsored charges
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In conclusion, plaintiffs do not dispute that city may
charge the three subdi viders a "connection fee'' based upon the
expenses actually incurred in connecting the subdividers'
lines to the water line of the city.

Such a charge would be

legitimate since it would cover the cost actually incurred.
However, for the city to charge each subdivider for the aggregate
number of potential lots which may utilize the system is clearly
an abuse of any intended statutory authority a city may have in
charging hookup fees.

For these reasons, the trial court was

correct in finding that Utah law does not permit this type of
fee scheme.
B.

Defendant's Fee Structure for Water Connection is

Contrary to the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution.
The present Extension Agreement how required by South
Jordan City violates Article I, Section 2 and Section 7 of the
Utah Constitution as well as the "Equal Protection" and "Due
t

Process" clauses of the United States Constitution.

This violation

occurs because of a wrongful taking of property (the hookup
fees)

and because of an unequal application of the fees to

differing

persons within the same class of people.

As to Plaintiffs' first contention of taking of property withe
due process, the case of Stanfield v. Burnett, 353 P.2d 242 (Or.
1960) is closely on point.

In that case a local ordinance was

enacted which required charges for property whether connected
or not to a sewer system and which required various charges
based upon the type of property involved.
The
of forOregon
rejected
ordinance
as
Sponsored
by the Supreme
S.J. Quinney LawCourt
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digitization provided
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a

valid assessment and held that the charges were not based upon
total construction costs and "any attempted assessment prior to
construction in determination of total costs is nullity."
at 245.

Id.

The court then stated:

Since the amounts attempted to be collected are not
assessments, may they be justified as charges for
use? Obviously not, since the charges are not
based upon use but upon the fact that the property
was within 200 feet of the sewer line.

* * *
Because there is no constitutional or statutory
authority in this state for making a charge for
Prospective use, we hold such charge may not be
made unless it is levied as an assessment, which
was not done here. We say this for several reasons.
First, if it be sustained as a charge for prospective
use, then it would necessarily follow that it was
based upon benefit to the property and not upon the
user, and, hence, it could only be sustained if it
was a valid assessment under the rules above
referred to. Secondly, a charge for the use of a
sewer is not a tax or assessment but is a charge for
a service rendered and is based upon contract.

* * *
The trans:action really amounts to an offer by the
municipal corporationand an acceptance by the party
who takes the water, thus forming a contract. Since
there was no actual user shown in this case, there
could be no acceptance, and hence, no contract. Therefore, it is inescapable that Plaintiff by this proceeding
is attempting to confiscate private property without
any legal basis therefor. The fact that the property
may have been incidentally benefited is not enough in
the absence of statutory or constitutional authority.
Id. at 246. (Emphasis added.)
This same argument against "prospective" use is applicable
in the instant case since the Plaintiffs are being forced to pay
for water connection fees where the Plaintiffs themselves will
re.cei ve no service or benefit and no burden will be imposed on
the city until such time as individual property owners occupy
each Sponsored
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for a city-wide water system, it is obligated to issue bonds or
create a special assessment district for such purposes rather
than to attempt utilization of a "hookup" fee for such purpose.
Even in cases where a city has created a special assessment
district for the purpose of making capital improvements, the
courts have uniformly held that any ordinance which requires a
property owner to pay an assessment fee for which his property
does not receive an immediate benefit is unconstitutional.
In City and County of Denver v. Greenspoon, 344 P.2d 679 (Colo.
1959) the Colorado Supreme Court held that a special assessment
tax would amount to confiscation without due process of law when
it was not shown that the property included in the assessment
area would receive a benefit and in fact it was shown that the
property could never use the improvement.
The court in that case quoted a previous Colorado decision
in which the rule was stated;
Special assessments for local improvements are
authorized and permitted upon the theory that the
property against which they are levied derives some
special, immediate, and peculiar benefits by reason
of the improvement, other, in addition to, and
different from that enjoyed by other property in the
community outside of the district in which the improvement is made.
344 P.2d at 681 (Emphasis added.)
Defendant's reliance upon Call v. City of West Jordan,
606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) is misplaced.

In that case this

Court upheld an ordinance which required a subdivider to dedicate
seven percent of its land to the city or pay an equivalent in
cash for flood control and/or park and recreation facilities.
In a three to two decision this Court concluded that under
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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general statutory authority the city was empowered to provide
for its parks and flood controls and could legitimately require
a

sµbdivider to contribute either land or money to this end.
While Plaintiffs disagree with the majority holding in

this case, as will be discussed infra,

this case relates to

parks and flood control which are entirely different from the
statutory requirements of water use fees.

Whereas the city

may be obligated to provide flood control and parks for its
citizens regardless of whether it is requested to or not,
the city does not have to provide water connections for
individuals who do not desire to utilize the water service.
Thus, while a city can legitimately assess a lot owner for
flood control, for parks, and for capital improvements, it cannot
force the lot owner to pay a "connection fee" to a water line
when there is no building on the lot requiring the mandatory
sewer connection.
A requirement that the plaintiffs pay a fee for services
whichwillnever be rendered to them as subdividers and which require
plaintiff to pay 100 percent of the "hookup" charges when no
hookups have occurred is clearly a taking of property without
due process.

Since there is no assurance that any of these

lots will ever be hooked up to the city water system, the constitutional violation is even greater.
In addition, the application cf the Extension Agreement
also violates the "equal protection" clause of the Utah and United
States

Constitutions since it is treating plaintiffs- subdividers

differently from other owners of residential property.
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The ordinance as written does not violate constitutional
principles.

However, the ordinance as applied by its extension

agreement does create unfair discrimination.

The rule has been

stated as follows:
A law, though fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, which is of such a nature that i t
may be applied and administered with an evil
eye and unequal hand so as to make an unjust
and illegal discrimination is, when so applied
and administered, within the prohibition of the
Federal Constitution. Hence, in a consideration
of the classification embodied in a statute,
regard should be given not only to its final
purpose but likewise to the means provided for
its administration.
16 Am. Jur. 2d,
Section
540, pp. 929-930.
This same authority also makes the following distinction:
Due process of law is denied when any particular person
of a class or of the community is singled out for
the imposition of restraints or burdens not imposed
upon, and to be borne by, all of the class or of
the community at large, unless the imposition or
restraint is based upon existing distinctions that
di.fferentiate the particular individuals of the
class to be affected from the body of the community.
16 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 551, pp. 950-951.
In this case, the Plaintiff subdividers are required to pay
in advance for services to all lots in the subdivisions even
though no service is rendered.

On theother hand, an individual

property owner who owns his own lot and who is not in a subdivision is only required to pay the fee at the time the connection is actually amde.

There is no valid distinction between

these two classes of individuals since in both cases the services
of the city are not used until the connection is made and no
greater burden is placed upon the city in either case.
In addition, the present application is discriminatory
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developed their property prior to the formulation of the
extension agreement.

1

These subdividers were not required to

prepay the water fee before being able to build upon their
property.
In the case of Watts v. Alpine City, 4th Dist. Ct. No. 48-518
(1979) two plaintiffs filed an action against Alpine City alleging
that an impact fee which required them to pay 1.5 percent of the
total valuation of any new construction before a building permit
was issued was a denial of equal protection of the law since
old residents whose homes had previously been built did not have
to pay this impact fee.
the

In ruling on behalf of the plaintiffs,

Honorable George Ballif in granting plaintiffs' motion for

summary judgment stated the following:
Alpine City's so-called impact fee, Ordinance
No. 02-77, enacted February 14, 1977, puts
an undue and discriminatory burden upon the
new building residents of Alpine City as contrasted with the old residents whose homes
have been built since the impact fee was placed
in effect. Said ordinance, therefore, is in
violation of the fundamental rights established
in Section 2 of Article 1 of the Utah State
Constitution granting citizens equal protection
of law.
This Court recently in the case of Continental Bank and
Trust Company v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1979)
again stated the principle that a law is discriminatory in the
sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional where some persons
or transactions excluded from the operation of law are, as to
its subject matter, in no different class than those included
in its operation.

See also Weber Basin Home Builders Association

v. Roy City, 487 P.2d 866 (Utah 1971).

(Building Permit fee
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discriminatory since it charged new residents higher rates than
older residents) .
Here, an owner of a vacant lot in South Jordan City which
has a city water line running next to it is not obligated to pay
the $1,000 "connection fee" until such time as he builds a
building and installs a sewer.

On the other hand, plaintiffs who

presently own hundreds of lots are required to pay these "hookup
charges" even though the water is never hooked up and even though
it will never be used by the plaintiffs.

In addition, other

subdividers who have built in thearea previously did not have to
incur the prepayment penalties and were thus given an unfair
economic advantage over plaintiffs.
For these reasons, as an alternate ground, the ordinance
as supplemented by the Water

Serv~ce

Agreement is patently un-

constitutional.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PARKS
IMPROVEMENT FEE.
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' Third, Fourth
and Fifth Causes of Action finding that "no stat.utory prohibition
exists as collecting park fees in advance and that such fees
are valid and do not violate the due process nor equal protection
provisions of the Constitution."

(R. 54).

It is from this

Order that plaintiffs cross appeal.
A.
Charge the

There is No Statutory Authority Allowing the City to
~ark

Improvement fee, and, in Addition, Such Fee is
-18-
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Unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice Wilkins
and Maughn in Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217,
222-229 in support of their argument that Utah law does not
allow the city of South Jordan to charge a park improvement
fee to plaintiffs when such park will never be utilized by
plaintiffs and any parks built will be for the benefit of the
city as a whole.
Plaintiffs would urge this Court to reexamine its decision
in Call in light of the circumstances of this case.

Unlike the

cases relied upon by defendants in Call, there are no state
statutes authorizing either a fee or dedication of land for
park purposes.

See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of Greater East

Bay Incorporated v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal.
1971)

(Section 11546 of the Business and Professional Code) .

Unlike these states, Utah statutory authority only gives its
cities the power to make assessments or levy taxes for the
benefit of its park system.
The imposition of a park fee as a condition for completion
of a water system shows the extremes in which this type of scheme
can carry.

In addition, the city of South Jordan has placed the

park funds obtained from the plaintiffs into its general funding
which, as Justice Wilkins observed, is contrary to previous Utah
law requiring special funds to be established.

606 P.2d at

228-229.
If Utah wishes to utilize a land planning concept it should
do so by means of specific statutory authority as has been done in
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of private individuals and corporations for these purposes,
without statutory authority, is clearly an ultra vires act on
the part of municipalities.

It is for the legislature, not

the courts, to provide a statutory system which meets constitutional requirements if land or money is to be appropriated.
For this reason, plaintiffs respectfully request that the
Call decision be reconsidered in light of the circumstances :of
this case.
B.

In the Alternative, the Reasonableness of the Park

Impact Fee Must be Decided by a Full Evidentiary Hearing.
Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action allege that the $235
park improvement fee "is far in excess of defendant's cost for
developing and maintaining the said park," and in their Fifth
Cause of Action maintain that plaintiffs will not derive any
benefit from the payment of a park improvement fee.

Thus,

plaintiffs assert that the statutory fee is unnecessary for the
development of a park system in the subdivision and is in excess
of any reasonable amount to be levied for such purposes.
This Court in Call v. City of West Jordan, slip opinion
(filed June 27, 1980, Utah) on rehearing stated that a dedication
of private land or a substitute fee "should have some reasonable
relationship to the need created by the subdivision."

This

Court then quoted a Missouri case which stated:
. . . If the burden cast upon the subdivider is
reasonably attributable to his activity, then
the requirement [of dedication or fees in lieu
thereof] is permissible; if not, it is forbidden
and amounts to a confiscation of private property
in contravention of the constitutional prohibition
rather than reasonable regulations of the police
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needs of the city, then to that extent the cost
of meeting that increase indeed may reasonably
be required of the subdivider.
Quoting Homebuilders Association of Greater Kansas City
v. City of Kansas, 555

s.w.

2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977)

0

Thus, even under the present status of the law as
established by the Call case, plaintiffs are entitled to a trial
as to whether the park fee is reasonably related to any increase
need for recreation in the area created by the subdivision.
For this reason, the lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs'
Complaint should be vacated and the matter remanded for trial.
CONCLUSION
The lower court correctly entered summary judgment against
Defendant.

The imposition of a "hookup" fee for plaintiffs based

upon all total lots in the subdivisions is clearly not permitted
by Utah law.

Plaintiffs are being charged for services to hundreds

of lots which might not ultimately occur for many years.

Other

cities charge hookup fees only as each individual lot is developed
-- Defendant must do the same.

In addition, this prepayment

scheme is unconstitutional since it violates both due process and
equal protection.
Finally, the lower court erred by dismissing plaintiffs'
Complaint as to the Park Improvement Fee since it too is not authorized under Utah law.

In any event, plaintiffs are entitled to

attack the reasonableness and necessity of such a fee in a trial
on the merits as stated in the last Call decision.
For these reasons, the order of summary judgment should be
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affirmed and the order of dismissal reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

CRAIG • COO
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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